Philosophy 302: Philosophy of Science [under construction]

Please note that this article is not yet complete.

Contents:

Introduction

Part A: Science the Product

Section 1. Sorts of sciences
Section 2. Analyses of the sorts of sciences
Section 3. Theories of the nature of scientific knowledge

Part B: Science the Process

Section 5: Persons in the science process
Section 6: Scientific disvalues
Section 7: Scientific values
Section 8: Sorts of explanation
Section 9. Scientific methods
Section 10: The problems of scientific method
Section 11: The analogy of the scientific and evolutionary processes
Section 12: Science and mathematics

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Introduction

Several of the subject matters of philosophy can be treated as both processes and products. Science is a prime example of this. A product, treated philosophically, has sorts that require analysis, and gives rise to theories as to its nature. These are outlined for science in Part A. A process involves persons, methods, and positive and negative values. These are outlines in Part B. In addition, there are several section on topics peculiar to this sunject matter.

In what follows, my use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that the central concepts in the various subject matters of philosophy can be non-arbitrarily sorted into three groups.

Section 1: Sorts of sciences

There are three main sorts of sciences:

G1. The Physical sciences
G2. The Social sciences
G3. Technology

Yes, technology does belong here. Science advances, in large part, by advances in technology. Think of astronomy without the telescope, biology without the microscope. And, of course, technology advances with science. There is no separating them.

However, the present article emphasizes the theoretical aspect of the physical sciences / technology partnership.

Section 2: Analyses of the sorts of sciences

Scientific knowledge is propositional knowledge, and propositional knowledge has traditionally been analyzed, in ideal terms, as (1) belief that is (2) true and (3) justified. Science, however, has developed as a form of propositional knowledge that is defined in pragmatic rather than ideal terms. Instead of belief that is true and justified, the product of the scientific process has come to be analysed in terms of (1) theory that is (2) revisible and (3) more or less evident.

Three concepts are central to the following analyses: description, explanation, and prediction. Before outlining the analyses of the sorts of sciences we need to clarify these concepts.

G1. Description.

Scientific description is in terms of the properties of empirical objects and events. There are three main sorts of properties:

G1.1: Qualities
G1.2: Relations
G1.3: Quantities

For more detail about properties see Philosophy 203: The Real and the Unreal.

It is important to note that descriptive propositions are in the present tense.

G2: Explanation and reasoning.

Scientific explanation is in terms of three pairs of explanatory concepts. In scientific reasoning, the direction of the explanatory relation is reversed. A prediction is an explanation in reverse.

G2.1: Explanation of perceptions by properties. (Example: a green plant is green because it contains chlorophyl and chlorophyl reflects the green part of the light spectrum.) Inference of perceptions from properties. (Example: Chlorophyl reflects the green part of the light spectrum, therefore, plants containing chlorophyl are seen to be green).

G2.2: Explanation of structure by function. (Example: the circulatory system is structured as tubes, valves, and a pump because its function is to circulate a fluid throughout the tissues.) Inference of function from structure. (Example: elastic lung-tissue is structured as a hollow tree of increasingly fine tubes which finally interface with the de-oxygenated, carbon-dioxide loaded sector of the blood-stream; the airway-tree is open to the oxygenated atmosphere; therefore this stucture functions to tranfer oxygen from the atmosephere to the blood and carbon-dioxide from the blood to the atmosphere.)

G2.3: Explanation of effect by cause. (Example: from position p the red ball rolled into the side pocket because it was truck by the white ball in way X [X = a mathematically precise account of the way]. Inference of cause from effect. (Example: the red ball rolled into the side pocket from position p; therefore, its behaviour was caused by its being struck at position p by the white ball in way X.)

G3: Prediction. Scientific prediction, like scientific description is in terms of the properties (qualities, relations, and quantities) of empirical objects and events. Howewer, unlike description, which is in the present tense, prediction is in the future tense. Prediction is inferred from explanation.

An analysis of the concept of physical sciences:

G1. Theory

A scientifiic theory in the physical sciences is a complex of three interrelated aspects: description, explanation, and predicition.

G1 Description of the material world (including matter in space, in time, and in motion).

G2 Explanation in terms of the material-perceptual and cause-effect concepts of explanation (see also Philosophy 205: The Effective and the Ineffective).

G3 Prediction with reference to invariably reliable laws (Laws of Nature or Scientific Laws).

G2: Revisible. All three aspects of theory are revisible products of a process of observational, theoretic and experimental trial and error.

G3: Evident. A theory is evident to the extent that it successfully predicts observations of the behaviour of the material world with reference to the invariable laws seen as governing that behaviour.

An analysis of the concept of social sciences:

G1: Theory:

G1 Description of the changing (evolving) human social world.

G2 Explanation in terms of the final - formal (or functional - structural) concept of explanation or 'cause' (see Philosophy 205: The Effective and the Ineffective).

G3 Prediction in terms of the ends (goals, aims, functions) of social groups).

G2 Revisible:

The three aspects of theory in the social sciences are revisible products of a process of theoretic trial and error.

Social science is mostly theoretic trial and error ('thought experiment') because designed practical experiments in social behaviour would be socially disruptive. What practical experiment there is in social science is usually more opportunistic than designed.

G3 Evident:

A theory is evident to the extent that is successfully predicts human social behaviour in terms of group ends (goals, aims, functions).

A problem the social sciences have that the physical sciences don't have is that prediction of human behaviour can easily be self-defeating. This is not because people perversely want to see such a prediction fail, but because, as 'scientific knowledge', it becomes a factor in people's calculation of how they intend to behave.

Another difficulty for the social sciences is that human social relations are quantifiable only to a very limited and imprecise extent.

An analysis of the concept of technology:

G1: Theory

G1 Description of world as instrumental to the realization of human ends (goals, needs, wants).

G2 Explanation in terms of the cause-effect concept of explanation.

G3 Prediction in terms of the mathematically precise measurement of chemical, biological and mechanical processes.

G2: Revisible

Technological theory is revisible by a process of practical and experimental trial and error.

G3: Evident

Technological theory is evident according to its success at predicting practical means to human ends.

Section 3. Positions on the nature of scientific knowledge

G1: Scientific Realism

This is the position that the objects and processes referred to in scientific theories are real. They are real in that they are things the existence (and only the existence) of which is independent of the theories that refer to them. This means that prevailing scientific knowledge is
definable as being the truth about those real things.

G2: Verisimilitudism

This is the position that, whether or not the things referred to in scientific theory are real, the truth about them is not a matter of definability but depends upon the coherence of theories. And, since science is not and has never been completely coherent, this means that our best scientific theories are only more or less close approaches to the truth. 'Verisimilitude' means degree of likeness to the truth.

G3: Instrumentalism

This is a purely pragmatic position about scientific theory. It says that we cannot know whether the things referred to in those theories are real, and nor can we know those theories are true or even truth-like. What we can know is how well those theories work as predictors of observation. In other words, a scientific theory is merely an instrument for (a means to) the successful prediction of observation.

See also Section 12: Why has science been so successful?

Part B: Science the Process

Section 5: Persons in the science process

G1: The observer
G2: The theoretician
G3: The technician / experimenter

Section 6: Scientific disvalues

Modern science has been the project to improve upon:

G1. Unempirical, myth-based DESCRIPTION

Pre-science, our best descriptions of the world largely ignored the evidence of the senses and made its description by analogy with myth(imagination) rather than perception.

G2. Merely confirmable, and, in principle, unfalsifiable EXPLANATION

Before science (and even for a long time into it)theories claiming to explain the world were assumed to be good (true) if the behaviour of the world could be interpreted as evidence that confirmed (gave support to) the theory. An ideal theory was considered to be one that could account for any and all phenomena within its scope. The worry about this, it was eventually realised, is that several quite different theories, all with the same scope, can co-exist and all explain the same phenomena with much the same success.

G3. PREDICTION by chance

Before science, the strategy of would-be explainers had always been to emphasize successful predictions (which were successful largely by chance) and de-emphasize unsuccessful predictions or explain them away as insiginificant anomalies.

Section 7: Scientific values

G1. Empirically-based, accurate DESCRIPTION of the real.

This is description constructed from the evidence of the senses. All description proceeds by analogy, and thus objects are described in terms of pre-established descriptive concepts.

G2. In-principle falsifiable, coherent (true, or truth-like) EXPLANATION

This is explanation that admits of evidence that, if it were forthcoming, would show the theory to be false either in whole or in part.

G3. Significant and law-guided PREDICTION of (ideally) both good and bad effects.

This is prediction, derived from the laws of in-principle falsifiable theory, that is thus counted as significant (as being merely compatible with the truth of the theory if successful, and as counting towards the falsification of the theory if unsuccessful).

Section 8: Sorts of explanation

G1. Analogical explanation
G2. Deductive explanation
G2a. Teleological explanation
G2b. Genetic explanation
G3. Inductive explanation
G3a. Causal explanation.

Section 9: Scientific methods

G1: Observation plus analogy

G2: In principle falsifiable hypothesis plus deduction and attempted falsification

G3a: Induction of theory plus confirmation of prediction
G3b: Anti-methodism (= omni-methodism)

Section 10: The problems of scientific method

G1: The problems of observation / description

The internal problem: the theory-ladenness of observation

Imagine you are an astronomer at the time of Galileo. The accepted theory of the solar system at that time was the geocentric theory - that the earth was motionless and the sun, moon, planets, stars, etc., all revolved around it. You accept the geocentric theory, so when you look at the sky you see the sun, moon, etc., moving around the earth. But then you meet Galileo who is a strong proponent of Copernicus's heliocentric theory - that the earth, moon, etc., all revolve
around the sun. Galileo convinces you that theory better describes what is observed in the sky. Now when you look at the sky you see the sun, etc., only *apparently* moving across the sky due to the rotation of the earth on its axis.

The point of this is to show that what we think we are observing depends upon what theory we accept. Further, there can be no observation that is free of theory. In other words, observation and description always either (i) presuppose a theory or, (ii) are expressed in terms that are biased towards one theory or another.

The external problem: the influence of the observer upon the observed

In observing the material world, the world of causes and effects, the observer cannot help but have some effect upon what he/she is observing.

G2: The problems of theory / explanation

The internal problem: the underdetermination of theory by evidence

The external problem: the irreducibility of the sciences

G3: The problems of practice / prediction

The internal problem: the problem of induction

The external problem: the problem of unwanted effects

Section 11: The analogy between the scientific and evolutionary processes

In biological evolution an individual organism (= a genetic trial) is 'selected' by its environment (unless it is in error = unfit to survive). Its 'selection' means it survives to reproduce, giving rise to new but genetically similar individuals. Thus the genetic makeup of the biological group, the species, to which the surviving individuals belong, is indirectly structured by the agent of selection, namely the environment in which the species lives. So it is the species that is changed by the evolutionary process, not the individual. It is the species that 'adapts' to its environment, not the individual organism.

By analogy, in the scientific process, a hypothesis (a conceptual trial) is selected by the evidential environment (unless it is shown to be in error). Its selection means it survives to become part of scientific theory, giving rise to new but conceptually related hypotheses. Thus scientific theory evolves by the evidential selection of hypotheses.

In biolgical evolution the genetic makeup of a few rare individuals is more or less radically altered at conception. The radical alteration is called genetic mutation. Mutated individuals rarely survive, but when they do survive they can bring about radically new adaptations in the species. It has been claimed that something analogous to genetic mutation can also happen in science (see my article "What Your Life Has In Common With A Spinning Top And The History Of Science").

Section 12: Science and mathematics

G1. Precise description and mathematics - accrate counting.

G2. Precise explanation and mathematics - coherent and novel structuring of theory

G3. Precise prediction and mathematics - precisely measured causing of precisely measurable effects.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Sorts of sciences:
G1: Physical
G2: Social
G3: Technology

Theories of the nature of science:
G1: Scienticfic Realism
G2: Verisimilitudism
G3: Instrumentalism

Persons in science:
G1: Observer
G2: Theoretician
G3: Technician / experimenter

Scientific disvalues:
G1: Unempirical description
G2: Merely confirmable explanation
G3: Predicition by chance

Scientific values:
G1: Empirically based description
G2: Falsifiable explanation
G3: Law-guided prediction

Scientific methods:
G1: Empirical observation and analogy
G2: Hypothetico-deduction
G3a: Induction and confirmation
G3: Omni-methodism

Responses to the problem of induction:
G1:
G2: Anti-inductivism
G3:

Sorts of explanation:
G1: Analogical
G2a: Deductive
G2b: Teleological
G2c: Genetic
G3a: Inductive
G3b: Causal

Scientific (applied) mathematics:
G1: Precise description (counting)
G2: Precise explanation (structuring)
G3: Precise prediction (measuring)